In this paper, we extend the results of Sato [Sato, N., 2009 . Nonsatiation and existence of competitive equilibrium, G-COE GLOPE II Working Paper Series No.15] to economies with unbounded-from-below choice sets: we prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium (to be exact, a quasi-equilibrium) by assuming the "boundary satiation" condition introduced in Sato (2009) and the "strong compactness of individually rational utility set" introduced in Martins-da-Rocha and Monteiro [Martins-da-Rocha, V. F., Monteiro, C. K., 2009. Unbounded exchange economies with satiation: how far can we go? Journal of Mathematical Economics 45, 465-478]. As a result, we obtain a new equilibrium existence theorem that can be applied to the case in which choice sets are unbounded from below and satiation occurs only inside the set of individually rational feasible choices.
Introduction
This paper is a sequel to Sato (2009) , 1 in which we introduced a new condition concerning the satiation property of preferences and established the existence of a competitive equilibrium under it. The new condition, which we here call boundary satiation (BS), asserts that if satiation occurs inside the individually rational feasible consumption set, then satiation should also occur on a "boundary" of the set. The condition BS generalizes the standard nonsatiation assumption and Allouch and Le Van's (2008 Van's ( , 2009 ) weak nonsatiation. 2 In particular, of these conditions, only BS allows the set of satiation points to be a subset of the individually rational feasible consumption set.
Unfortunately, Sato's (2009) existence results under BS depend on the boundedness of consumption sets (or that of individually rational feasible allocation set), and therefore, cannot be applied to securities markets with short-selling, in which choice sets are unbounded from below.
For the case of standard nonsatiation, Dana et al. (1999) show that the compactness of the individually rational utility set (CU) is sufficient for the existence of a competitive equilibrium. This condition CU allows choice sets (and the individually rational feasible allocation set) to be unbounded. Moreover, CU is implied by various types of no-arbitrage conditions, which are intended to bound the economies with unbounded-from-below choice sets endogenously by limiting arbitrage opportunities.
3
On the other hand, Martins-da-Rocha and Monteiro (2009) show that under Allouch and Le Van's (2008 Van's ( , 2009 ) weak nonsatiation, CU is not sufficient for the existence of a competitive equilibrium. However, they establish the existence of a competitive equilibrium under weak nonsatiation by introducing the notion of a strong compactness of the individually rational utility set (SCU). The condition SCU is stronger than CU in general, but it allows the individually rational feasible allocation set to be unbounded. Moreover, CU is equivalent to SCU under standard nonsatiation, and therefore Martinsda-Rocha and Monteiro's (2009) results unify the existence results of Dana 1 A revised version is attached to this paper. 2 Weak nonsatiation allows satiation inside the individually rational feasible consumption set, provided that satiation also occurs outside the set.
3 For details about the no-arbitrage conditions, in addition to Dana et al. (1999) , see Hart (1974) , Hammond (1983) , Werner (1987) , Page (1987) , Nielsen (1989) , Page and Wooders (1996) , Allouch et al. (2002) and Allouch et al. (2006) . et al. (1999) and Allouch and Le Van (2009) .
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The purpose of this paper is, based on the results of Martins-da-Rocha and Monteiro (2009) , to extend the results of Sato (2009) to economies with unbounded-from-below choice sets. Since BS contains weak nonsatiation as a special case, CU is not sufficient for the existence of a competitive equilibrium under BS. Therefore, we prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium (to be exact, a quasi-equilibrium) under BS and SCU. In the proof, we require no additional conditions other than the standard assumptions, as a result of which, we also generalize the results of Martins-da-Rocha and Monteiro (2009). Nielsen (1990) , Allingham (1991) and Won et al. (2008) investigate the existence of a competitive equilibrium in the context of the CAPM without a riskless asset.
5 In a more general setting, Won and Yannelis (2006) provide existence results that contain these results as a special case. In fact, the results of Won and Yannelis (2006) can be applied to the case in which neither BS nor SCU holds.
6 However, as shown in this paper, there are cases in which our existence result can be applied, while those of Won and Yannelis (2006) cannot. Therefore, this paper provides one of the weakest sets of conditions in the literature for the existence of a competitive equilibrium. This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we describe the model and list the assumptions. In Section 3, we first provide a preliminary existence result (Section 3.1), and then prove our main existence theorem (Section 3.2). Finally, in Section 4, we provide an example of an economy in which both BS and SCU hold, while Won and Yannelis's (2006) condition concerning satiation does not hold. 4 Martins-da-Rocha and Monteiro's (2009) results also generalize several existence results based on the no-arbitrage conditions, including the results of Hart (1974) , Werner (1987) , Allouch et al. (2006) . 5 In the CAPM without a riskless asset, satiation is rather a rule than an exception. See, for example, Nielsen (1987) and Won et al. (2008) .
6 See also, Won and Yannelis (2008) .
Model and Assumptions

Model
We consider a pure exchange economy E with ℓ commodities and n agents (ℓ, n ∈ N).
7 For convenience, let I be the set of all agents, that is, I = {1, · · · , n}. Each agent i ∈ I is characterized by a choice set X i ⊂ R ℓ , a utility function u i : X i → R, and an initial endowment e i ∈ R ℓ . Let X = ∏ i∈I X i with a generic element x = (x i ) i∈I , and put e = (e i ) i∈I ∈ R ℓn . The pure exchange economy E is thus summarized by the list
) .
An allocation x ∈ X is feasible if
Note that we do not allow free disposal. We denote the set of all feasible allocations by F .
An allocation x ∈ X is individually rational feasible if x ∈ F and u i (x i ) ≥ u i (e i ) for all i ∈ I. We denote the set of all individually rational feasible allocations by A. Let A i be the projection of A onto X i , and refer to it as the individually rational feasible choice set of agent i ∈ I. In addition, let
We define the individually rational utility set U as follows:
The utility function u i is satiated at s i ∈ X i if s i maximizes u i over X i , and s i is called a satiation point of u i . Let S i denote the set of all satiation points of u i , that is,
We adopt the following standard definitions of competitive equilibrium and quasi-equilibrium. 7 We use the following mathematical notations. The symbols N, R ℓ , and R ℓ + denote the set of natural numbers, ℓ-dimensional Euclidean space, and the nonnegative orthant of R ℓ , respectively. For x, y ∈ R ℓ , we denote by x · y = ∑ ℓ j=1 x j y j the inner product, and by ∥x∥ = √ x · x the Euclidean norm. Let B(x 0 , r) = {x ∈ R ℓ : ∥x − x 0 ∥ < r} denote the open ball centered at x 0 with radius r. For a ∈ R = R 1 , we denote by |a| the absolute value of a. For a, b ∈ R with a ≤ b, we denote by (a, b) and [a, b] , the open interval and closed interval between a and b, respectively. For a set A ⊂ R ℓ , we denote by int A, cl A, and bd A, the interior, closure, and boundary of A in R ℓ , respectively.
We can divide the existence proof of a competitive equilibrium of E into two parts: (i) proving that there exists a quasi-equilibrium of E, and (ii) proving that the quasi-equilibrium is also a competitive equilibrium. Since the analysis concerning part (ii) is well established (or can be done independent of (i)),
8 in this paper we focus on the existence of a quasi-equilibrium of E.
Assumptions
In this subsection, we present the assumptions used in this paper.
The following two sets of assumptions are quite standard in the literature.
8 There are several known sets of assumptions under which every quasi-equilibrium is also a competitive equilibrium. The following is the simplest: (a) e i ∈ int X i and (b) u i is continuous on X i for each i ∈ I. For further details, see Geistdoerfer-Florenzano (1982) .
9 A function f : X → R is upper semicontinuous on X ⊂ R ℓ if and only if for all α ∈ R, the set {x ∈ X : f (x) ≥ α} is closed in X.
(b) u i is strictly quasi-concave.
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For each i ∈ I, let int R i A i denote the interior of A i in the relative topology 
Concerning the satiation property of preferences, we use the following assumption introduced in Sato (2009) .
Assumption 3 (BS). For each i
Assumption 3 is a generalization of the standard nonsatiation assumption (that is, S i ∩ A i = ∅ for all i ∈ I) and weak nonsatiation introduced in Allouch and Le Van (2008 Van ( , 2009 .
11 We refer to Assumption 3 as boundary satiation (BS) based on the fact that if We also use the following assumption that is stronger than BS.
Assumption 4 (INS). For each i
Under Assumption 4, every u i must be nonsatiated on int R i A i , the interior of A i (in the relative topology of R i ), and therefore, we refer to the assumption as interior nonsatiation (INS) . Note that INS is weaker than the standard nonsatiation assumption by (b). Dana et al. (1999) show that under Assumptions 1 and 2 and the standard nonsatiation, the following condition is sufficient for the existence of a quasiequilibrium.
Assumption 5 (CU).
The individually rational utility set U is compact.
The compactness of U is a weaker property than the compactness of A. In particular, it allows A to be unbounded.
We next prove that (ii) of Definition 2 holds. Suppose that for some i ∈ I, there exists 
Note that Theorem 1 generalizes the results of Martins-da-Rocha and Monteiro (2009, Theorem 6.1) and Sato (2009, Theorem 2) .
Proof of Theorem 1. In this proof, we assume that e i / ∈ S i for all i ∈ I. This assumption is not a real restriction as far as the existence of a quasiequilibrium is concerned. To observe this, let I s = {i ∈ I : e i ∈ S i }, and consider the economy obtained by removing agents who belong to I s .
15 If we can prove the existence of a quasi-equilibrium (x, p) ∈ ∏ i∈I\Is X i × R ℓ \ {0} in the modified economy, then together with p, the allocation x ′ ∈ ∏ i∈I X i , defined by x ′ i = x i for i ∈ I \ I s and x i = e i for i ∈ I s , clearly constitutes a quasi-equilibrium of the original economy.
Let ξ i ∈ argmax{u i (x i ) : x i ∈ A i } for each i ∈ I, as in the proof of Theorem 1. Then, BS implies that there there exists Following Martins-da-Rocha and Monteiro (2009) 
We consider the auxiliary economy E(v) obtained by replacing u i with 
Proof of Claim 5. Suppose that
The second part of the claim immediately follows from the fact that
is a quasi-equilibrium of the original economy E. To observe this, it suffices to show that (ii) of Definition 2 holds.
For
which is the desired conclusion. Remark 1. As noted before, under INS, the assumption CU implies SCU.
To observe this, suppose that CU and INS hold. Let (x ν ) ν∈N be a sequence in A. Then, CU implies that there exist a feasible allocation y ∈ A, and a subsequence (
Let
Then, equation (1) clearly holds for all i ∈ I ns . Suppose that I \ I ns ̸ = ∅. Passing to a subsequence if necessary, we may assume that x ν k i ∈ S i for all k and i ∈ I \ I ns . Then, (2) implies that y i ∈ S i for all i ∈ I \ I ns . Since S i ∩ A i is a singleton by INS, we must have
for all k and i ∈ I \ I ns . It is now clear that (1) holds for all i ∈ I.
Example
In this section, we provide an example of an economy in which both BS and SCU hold. In the economy, the individually rational feasible allocation set is unbounded, and neither standard nonsatiation nor weak nonsatiation holds. Moreover, the economy does not satisfy Won and Yannelis's (2006) condition concerning satiation.
Let E be an exchange economy with two commodities and two agents defined as follows. Agents' choice sets are
where x ij denotes the quantity of j-th commodity chosen by agent i = {1, 2}. Agents' utility functions are
Note that S 1 = {x 1 ∈ X 1 : x 11 = 1} and S 2 = ∅. Finally, the initial endowments are e 1 = e 2 = (2, 2). It is then easy to check that E satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2. We next prove that E satisfies CU.
First, we prove that U is bounded. Let λ ∈ U, then there exists
Clearly, 0 ≤ λ 1 ≤ 1. We also have (2 ≤)λ 2 ≤ 4. To observe this, suppose that λ 2 > 4. Then, x 21 = u 2 (x 2 ) ≥ λ 2 > 4 and x 11 < 0. However, this implies that u 1 (x 1 ) < 0 = u 1 (e 1 ), which is a contradiction. Therefore,
in other words, U is bounded. We next prove that U is closed. Let (λ ν ) ν∈N be a sequence on U converging to some λ ∈ R 2 . Then, for each ν ∈ N, there exists x ν ∈ A such that
Suppose first that λ 2 ≤ 3, and let x = (x 1 , x 2 ) be the allocation with x 1 = (1, 1) and x 2 = (3, 1). Clearly, x ∈ A. Since x 1 ∈ S 1 , we have λ
) ν∈N is bounded. Therefore, passing to a subsequence if necessary, we may suppose that the sequence converges to a vector (x 11 , x 21 ) in R 2 , which satisfies x 11 + x 21 = 4.
Since λ 2 > 3, we have λ
for all i ∈ I, and for all sufficiently large ν. Taking the limit as ν → ∞ for each i ∈ I, we have
Note that we also have x 11 ≤ 1. Let
which implies that λ ∈ U. Therefore, U is compact. According to Martins-da-Rocha and Monteiro (2009, Proposition 7.1), in an economy with at most two agents CU is equivalent to SCU. Therefore, E satisfies SCU. Note that A i is unbounded for each i ∈ I, which implies the unboundedness of A.
We prove that E satisfies BS. Since S 2 = ∅, it suffices to check that agent 1 satisfies BS. Let s 1 = (1, 4). Then, it is clear that
Then, it is clear that x
, and thus, E satisfies BS. Note that since S 1 ⊂ A 1 , agent 1 satisfies neither standard nonsatiation nor weak nonsatiation.
Finally, we prove that E does not satisfy Won and Yannelis's (2006) condition concerning satiation.
Let I s = {i ∈ I : S i ⊂ A i }, and for an allocation x ∈ X, let I ns (x) = {i ∈ I :
In our framework, the condition of Won and Yannelis (2006, Assumption S5') can be expressed as follows:
Note first that I s = {1} in our economy. Let x ∈ A(s 1 ) for an arbitrary chosen s 1 ∈ S 1 . Then, there exists x 2 ∈ X 2 such that x = (s 1 , x 2 ) ∈ A. We also have I ns (x) = {2} and I \ I ns (x) = {1}. Since s 1 ∈ S 1 , we have s 11 = 1. Then, x 21 = 3 and P 2 (x 2 ) = {y 2 ∈ X 2 : y 21 > 3}.
Let p = (1, 0). Then, for agent 2 we have
However, for agent 1 we have Satiation and existence of competitive equilibrium
Introduction
In classical general equilibrium theory (Arrow and Debreu 1954, Debreu 1959 , among others), consumers' preferences are assumed to be "nonsatiated," that is, assumed to have no consumption bundle that is preferred to all other. However, in some cases, we observe that consumption sets are naturally compact (see Mas-Colell 1992) and every continuous preference has therefore at least one satiation point. As is well known in the literature, a simple way to avoid this inconsistency without affecting the existence of a competitive equilibrium is to assume that when a preference has satiation points, they are always outside the set of individually rational feasible consumptions.
1 This modified nonsatiation assumption allows preferences to be satiated, but excludes the case in which satiation occurs inside the individually rational feasible consumption sets.
It is well known that a competitive equilibrium may fail to exist when satiation occurs inside the individually rational feasible consumption set. Recently, however, Allouch and Le Van (2008 Van ( , 2009 ) have shown that even if there exists a consumer whose preference reaches satiation in his or her individually rational feasible consumption set, one can still obtain the existence of a competitive equilibrium by assuming that satiation also occurs outside the set. This assumption is a generalization of the standard nonsatiation assumption (including the modified one) and called "weak nonsatiation." (2006) introduce a different assumption that allows for satiation inside the individually rational feasible consumption sets. In fact, their assumption applies to the case in which satiation occurs only inside the individually rational feasible consumption sets and contains Allouch and Le Van's weak nonsatiation as a special case. Moreover, in their existence proofs, consumers' preferences are allowed to be non-ordered and individually rational feasible consumption sets do not need to be bounded. These advantages make their results applicable to securities markets with unlimited short-selling, in which choice sets are unbounded from below, and the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) without a riskless asset, in which satiation is rather a rule than an exception. However, Won and Yannelis's assumption contains a restriction on the price system, while weak nonsatiation, just like standard nonsatiation, depends solely on the characteristics of consumers.
The main contribution of this paper is to establish the existence of a competitive equilibrium under a new assumption that is weaker than Allouch 1 A consumption bundle is said to be individually rational feasible if it can be achieved by a trade in which every consumer involved attains at least the same utility as that gained from his or her initial endowment. For the existence proof under this assumption, see for example, Bergstrom (1976) , Dana et al. (1999) .
2 Allouch and Le Van (2008 Van ( , 2009 ) also prove that in securities markets with shortselling, Werner's (1987) nonsatiation assumption implies weak nonsatiation.
and Le Van's weak nonsatiation, and therefore, the standard nonsatiation assumption. Our assumption allows each consumer's preference to be satiated only inside the individually rational feasible consumption set, provided that at least one satiation point lies on a "boundary" of the set. One's individually rational consumption bundle belongs to the "boundary" if every neighborhood of the bundle contains at least one point that is at least as good as his or her initial endowment but is not individually rational feasible. Although our existence results rely on the ordered preferences and bounded individually rational feasible consumption sets, the new assumption does not imply Won and Yannelis's (2006) assumption. Moreover, just like standard nonsatiation and weak nonsatiation, our assumption depends solely on the characteristics of consumers.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model and introduce the new assumption. In Section 3, we provide our main existence results. In Section 4, we consider an alternative to the new assumption and provide some related results. As a concluding remark, in Section 5, we compare our assumption with the assumption introduced by Won and Yannelis (2006) . Finally, the proofs of some propositions are provided in Appendix.
Model and Assumptions
Model
We consider a pure exchange economy E with ℓ commodities and n consumers (ℓ, n ∈ N).
3 For convenience, let I be the set of all consumers, that is, I = {1, · · · , n}. Each consumer i ∈ I is characterized by a consumption set X i ⊂ R ℓ , an initial endowment ω i ∈ R ℓ , and a utility function u i : X i → R. Let X = ∏ i∈I X i with a generic element x = (x i ) i∈I , and put ω = (ω i ) i∈I ∈ R ℓn .
3 We use the following mathematical notations. The symbols N, R ℓ and R ℓ + denote the set of natural numbers, ℓ-dimensional Euclidean space and nonnegative orthant of R ℓ , respectively. For x, y ∈ R ℓ , we denote by
∥x − x 0 ∥ < r} denote the open ball centered at x 0 with radius r. For a ∈ R = R 1 , we denote by |a| the absolute value of a. For a, b ∈ R with a ≤ b, we denote by (a, b) and [a, b] , the open interval and closed interval between a and b, respectively. For a set A ⊂ R ℓ , we denote by int A, cl A and bd A, the interior, closure and boundary of A in R ℓ , respectively.
The pure exchange economy E is thus summarized by the list
Note that we do not allow free disposal. We denote the set of all feasible allocations by F . Moreover, let F i be the individually feasible consumption set of consumer i ∈ I that is defined as the projection of F onto X i . In other words, for x i ∈ X i , we have x i ∈ F i if and only if there exists (
We denote the set of all individually rational feasible allocations by A. Let A i be the projection of A onto X i , and call it individually rational feasible consumption set of consumer i ∈ I.
Then, it is easy to check that
For simplicity of notation, we put
The utility function u i is satiated at s i ∈ X i if s i maximizes u i over X i , and we call s i a satiation point of u i . Let S i denote the set of all satiation points of u i , that is,
We adopt the following standard definitions of competitive equilibrium and quasi-equilibrium.
Assumptions
We first make the following two sets of assumptions on the economy E.
Assumption 1. For each i ∈ I, (a) X i is closed and convex, (b)
X i is bounded, (c) ω i ∈ X i .
Assumption 2. For each i ∈ I,
(a) u i is upper semicontinuous on X i ,
4
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As shown in Section 3.1, the existence of a quasi-equilibrium is ensured under Assumptions 1 and 2 and our new assumption on preference satiation introduced below. To prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium, however, we need some additional assumptions (see Section 3.2). It is worth noting that in our main existence theorems (Theorems 2 and 3), Assumption 1 (b) can be weakened to the boundedness of A by the standard truncation technique.
It is easy to check that under Assumptions 1 and 2, we have the following facts.
4 A function f : X → R is upper semicontinuous on X ⊂ R ℓ if and only if for all α ∈ R, the set {x ∈ X : f (x) ≥ α} is closed in X.
5 A function f : X → R is strictly quasi-concave if and only if for all x, y ∈ X with f (x) > f (y) and for all λ ∈ (0, 1), we have f (λx + (1 − λ)y) > f (y).
Fact 1. S i ̸ = ∅ for each i ∈ I.
Fact 2. R i , G i and A i are nonempty, compact and convex in R ℓ for each i ∈ I.
In particular, the convexity of R i in Fact 2 follows from the quasi-concavity of u i , 6 which is implied by Assumption 2 (b) under Assumptions 1 (a) and 2 (a).
Before introducing our new assumption on satiation property of preferences, we first define some additional notations.
We now introduce the following assumption.
Assumption 3. For each i ∈ I, if S
, this assumption allows consumer's satiation area to be a subset of the individually rational feasible consumption set, provided that it touches the complement of int R i A i in A i . In other words, under Assumption 3, we must have
Note that under Assumptions 1 and 2, the set A i \ int R i A i coincides with the boundary of A i in the relative topology on R i . Assumption 3 generalizes the following two assumptions.
[Nonsatiation] For each i ∈ I, we have
[Nonsatiation] is a standard assumption in the classical general equilibrium theory. It excludes the case in which satiation occurs inside the individually rational feasible consumption sets.
[Weak nonsatiation], introduced by Allouch and Le Van (2008 Van ( , 2009 , is a generalization of [Nonsatiation] . This assumption allows consumer's satiation points to be inside the individually rational feasible consumption set, provided that at least one satiation point lies outside A i . However, unlike Assumption 3, it does not apply to the case in which S i is a subset of A i .
Note In the following example, only Assumption 3 holds among the above three assumptions concerning satiation. Example 1. Consider an exchange economy E with two commodities and two consumers. Let X 1 = X 2 = R 2 + and ω 1 = ω 2 = (4, 4). Consumers' utility functions are as follows.
Note that u 1 has a unique satiation point s 1 = (4, 6), while u 2 is never satiated on X 2 (see Figure 1) .
Let y 2 = (4, 2) ∈ X 2 . Then, the allocation (s 1 , y 2 ) ∈ X 1 × X 2 is feasible. Moreover, since u 2 (y 2 ) = 4 = u 2 (ω 2 ), we have s 1 ∈ A 1 . Therefore, neither [Nonsatiation] nor [Weak nonsatiation] holds. We prove that Assumption 3 holds. Let ε 1 = (1, 0) ∈ R 2 , and for each t ∈ (0, 1], let
We claim that z 1 (t) ∈ R 1 \ A 1 for all t ∈ (0, 1]. To see this, note first that we have z 1 (t) + z 2 (t) = we have z 2 (t) / ∈ R 2 . Therefore, z 1 (t) / ∈ A 1 for all t ∈ (0, 1]. Since z 1 (t) ∈ R 1 \ A 1 for all t ∈ (0, 1] and z 1 (t) → s 1 as t → 0, we obtain s 1 ∈ A 1 \ int R 1 A 1 . Therefore, Assumption 3 holds.
It is easy to check that the allocation x = (s 1 , y 2 ) together with the price p = (1, 0) ∈ R 2 is a competitive equilibrium of E.
Note that this example also shows that Assumption 3 does not coincide with [Nonsatiation] even if S i is a singleton for all i ∈ I with S i ̸ = ∅.
Main Results
Existence of quasi-equilibrium
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate the existence of a quasiequilibrium of E under Assumptions 1 -3 (Theorem 2). In the proof, we use the following existence result by Allouch and Le Van (2009) . Van, 2009) 
Theorem 1. (Allouch and Le
Under Assumptions 1, 2 and [Weak nonsatiation], there exists a quasi
Remark 1. A careful reading of the original proof of Theorem 1 by Allouch and Le Van (2009) , which is based on the result of Dana et al. (1999, Theorem 1) , shows that the stated quasi-equilibrium allocation x is, in fact, an element of A, that is,
The strategy of our existence proof is as follows. First, under our assumptions, we can choose s = (s i ) i∈I ∈ S so that
Next, for this s, we construct a sequence {ω
that satisfies the following properties:
We then define an auxiliary economy 
in which each term is a quasi-equilibrium of E ν . Under our assumptions, we may assume that the sequence has a limit point, and we can prove that the 7 In the original version of Theorem 1 (Allouch and Le Van 2009, Theorem 2), the boundedness of A is assumed instead of Assumption 1 (b).
8 To be precise, we cannot always find a sequence {ω ν } ν∈N ⊂ R ℓn that satisfies all the properties stated above. However, as will be shown later, we may assume without loss of generality that there exists a sequence that satisfies the properties (a) and (b) as far as the existence of a quasi-equilibrium matters.
point is a quasi-equilibrium of the original economy.
The next lemma shows that for a fixed s ∈ S that satisfies (1), we can find a sequence {ε ν } ν∈N ⊂ R ℓ with certain properties. It will be used in our main existence theorem to construct the sequence {ω ν } ν∈N ⊂ R ℓn described above.
Lemma 1. Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, and suppose that there exists
Then, there exist {ε ν } ν∈N ⊂ R ℓ and ν ∈ N such that νε ν → 0 as ν → ∞, and for every ν ≥ ν and i ∈ I,
Proof. Let s = (s i ) i∈I ∈ S be the element that satisfies
In the following, we divide the proof into several cases, in each of which we construct a sequence {ε ν } ν∈N ⊂ R ℓ that satisfies the properties in the statement of the lemma.
Case 1. I bd = ∅ (equivalently, I out = I).
It is clear that the sequence {ε ν } ν∈N ⊂ R ℓ defined by ε ν = 0 for all ν ∈ N satisfies the desired properties.
Case 2. I bd ̸ = ∅.
We first consider the sequence {ε
It is clear that ε 
Proof of Claim 1. First, for each i ∈ I out , since
With respect to i ∈ I bd , we have the following claim.
Claim 2. For each i ∈ I bd , either (a) there exists ν i ∈ N such that
The proof of Claim 2 is provided in Appendix.
Let I in be the subset of I bd such that i ∈ I in if and only if there exists ν i ∈ N that satisfies
Note that if I \ I in ̸ = ∅, by the definition of I in and Claims 1 and 2, there exists ν out such that for every ν ≥ ν out and i ∈ I \ I in ,
Then, we have two cases.
Case 2-A.
It is clear that the sequence {ε ν } ν∈N ⊂ R ℓ defined by ε ν = ε ν out for each ν ∈ N satisfies all the properties in the statement of the lemma.
Case 2-B.
For simplicity of notation, we assume without loss of generality that
In view of the definition of I in , there exists ν in such that for all i ∈ I in and ν ≥ ν in ,
We construct the sequence {ε ν } ν∈N in several steps. First, for each fixed ν ≥ ν, we successively define M vectors ε
ℓ that satisfy the following two properties for each m ∈ I in :
, and
We first define ε ν 1 as follows.
Since 2ν 2 ∥ε
We need to show that (2) also holds for i = m = 1. 
The proof of Claim 3 is provided in Appendix.
If I \ I in = ∅, we may define ε ν 1 as the vector that satisfies
The proof of Claim 3 is not affected by this change.
Let m ∈ I in with m ≥ 2, and suppose that ε First, by property (ii) with respect to m − 1, we have, for all i
Note that for all q ∈ {1, · · · , m − 1}, by the first part of property (i) and the convexity of R q , we have s q + λε 
We claim that (4) also holds for i = m.
The proof of Claim 4 is provided in Appendix.
Therefore, we conclude that for each ν ≥ ν, there exist M vectors ε
ℓ that satisfy properties (i) and (ii) for each m ∈ I in . Note that by property (ii) with respect to m = M ,
We now define a sequence {ε
we have νε ν in → 0 as ν → ∞ (recall that for all ν ≥ ν and m ∈ I in , by the second part of property (i), we have 2 m ν 2m ∥ε
Then, from the definition, we have νε ν → 0 as ν → ∞. Moreover, by (5), we have, for every ν ≥ ν and i ∈ I,
which completes the proof.
Let {ε ν } ν∈N be the sequence that satisfies the properties stated in Lemma 1. The next Lemma shows that we may assume that
i∈I R i for all sufficiently large ν ∈ N as far as the existence of a quasi-equilibrium matters. 
Then, there exists a ℓ-dimensional vector p ̸ = 0 such that
Proof. Since
i∈I R i by Assumption 1 (c), if there exists a sequence {δ ν } ν∈N ⊂ R ℓ that satisfies the properties in the statement of the lemma, we must have 
Take arbitrary i ∈ I and x i ∈ R i . Since
Therefore, we obtain
We now state and prove the existence of a quasi-equilibrium of E.
Theorem 2. Under Assumptions 1 -3, there exists a quasi-equilibrium
Proof. By Assumptions 1 (a), 1 (b), 2 (a) and 3, there exists s = (s i ) i∈I ∈ S such that s i ∈ (int R i A i ) c for all i ∈ I. Then, by Lemma 1, there exist a sequence {ε ν } ν∈N ⊂ R ℓ and a natural number ν 1 ∈ N such that νε ν → 0 as ν → ∞, and for every ν ≥ ν 1 and
Suppose that the sequence {νε ν } ν∈N contains a subsequence {ν µ ε νµ } µ∈N that satisfies
Then, by Lemma 2, there exists p ∈ R ℓ \ {0} such that the element (ω, p) ∈ X × R ℓ \ {0} constitutes a quasi-equilibrium of E. Therefore, we may suppose without loss of generality that there exists ν 2 ∈ N such that for all ν ≥ ν 2 ,
By this relation, for each
Then, we have ω ν i ∈ R i ⊂ X i by the convexity of R i , and
Moreover, ω
Note that E ν differs from E only in its initial endowments.
By the definition, each E ν satisfies all the assumptions in Theorem 1. In particular, each E ν satisfies [Weak nonsatiation]. To see this, note first that for each i ∈ I, by (6) and (7),
For each i ∈ I, let
Finally, by this relation and (8),
where A ν i denotes the individually rational feasible consumption set of con-
In view of Definition 2, we may assume without loss of generality that p ν ∈ S(0, 1) = {p ∈ R ℓ : ∥p∥ = 1} for all ν ≥ ν. We now obtain a sequence {(
is compact, we may assume without loss of generality that the sequence has a limit point (x, p) ∈ X ×S(0, 1). We prove that (x, p) is a quasi-equilibrium of the original economy.
We first show that (a-2) of Definition 2 holds. Suppose that for some i ∈ I, there exists x i ∈ X i with 
for sufficiently large ν. However, this contradicts the fact that (x ν , p ν ) is a quasi-equilibrium of E ν . Thus, (a-2) of Definition 2 holds. It is easy to check that (x, p) satisfies (a-1) and (b) of Definition 2.
Therefore, we conclude that (x, p) ∈ X × S(0, 1) is a quasi-equilibrium of the original economy E.
Since p ̸ = 0 and ω i ∈ int X i , there exists y i ∈ X i such that p · y i < p · ω i . Let x i (t) = tx i + (1 − t)y i for each t ∈ (0, 1). It is clear that for all t ∈ (0, 1),
Moreover, since u i (x i ) > u i (x i ) and u i is continuous on X i , we have u i (x i (t)) > u i (x i ) for t sufficiently close to 1. However, this contradicts the fact that (x, p) is a quasi-equilibrium of E.
Therefore, we conclude that (x, p) ∈ X × R ℓ \ {0} is a competitive equilibrium of E.
Alternative assumption
In this section, we introduce an alternative to Assumption 3 and provide some related results.
Consider the following assumption.
The symbol int X i F i denotes the interior of F i in the relative topology on X i that is, for x i ∈ X i , we have x i ∈ int X i F i if and only if there exists a positive real number r > 0 such that B(x i , r) ∩ X i ⊂ F i . Assumption 5 allows S i to be a subset of the individually feasible consumption set F i , provided that S i touches the complement of int X i F i in X i . This assumption is a generalization of Sato's (2008) nonsatiation assumption, which asserts that
By replacing A i by F i and R i by X i for all i ∈ I in the statements and proofs of all the propositions provided in 3.1 (including Theorem 1), we obtain the existence of a quasi-equilibrium under Assumption 5.
Corollary 1. Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 5, there exists a quasi
- equilibrium (x, p) ∈ X × R ℓ \ {0} of E.
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Assumptions 3 and 5 do not imply each other in general. Indeed, Assumption 5 does not hold in Example 1 in 2.2 (in which s 1 lies on int X 1 F 1 ). In contrast, in Example 2 below, we observe that only Assumption 5 holds.
Example 2. Consider an exchange economy E with two commodities and two consumers. Let X 1 = {x 1 ∈ R 2 : 0 ≤ x 11 ≤ 10 and x 12 ≥ 0} and X 2 = R 2 + . Let ω 1 = (0, 10) and ω 2 = (10, 0). Consumers' utility functions are as follows. Note that u 1 is satiated at s 1 = (5, 10), while u 2 is never satiated on X 2 (see Figure 2 ).
By the above definitions, it is easy to check that Let r = min{r 1 , r 2 }. Then, from the above two relations,
Therefore, s i ∈ int X i F i , which is a contradiction.
Concluding Remark
As a concluding remark, we compare Assumption 3 with the assumption introduced by Won and Yannelis (2006) . Won and Yannelis (2006) establish the existence of a competitive equilibrium with satiation in more general settings than ours. For example, in their analysis, consumers' preferences are allowed to be non-ordered and individually rational feasible consumption sets do not need to be bounded. Moreover, their assumption concerning satiation allows each consumer's satiation area S i to be a subset of int R i A i , and therefore, does not imply Assumption 3. These advantages make their results applicable to securities markets with unlimited short-selling, in which the set A may be unbounded, and to the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) without a riskless asset, in which satiation inside int R i A i is likely to occur.
13
Nevertheless, as shown below, our assumption does not imply Won and Yannelis's assumption either.
To simplify the arguments, we consider the case in which if S i ̸ = ∅ for some i ∈ I, it consists of a unique element s i ∈ X i .
For an allocation x ∈ X, let I s (x) = {i ∈ I : x i ∈ S i } and I ns (x) = I \ I s (x). For a consumption bundle x i ∈ X i , let P i (x i ) = {y i ∈ X i : u i (y i ) > u i (x i )}. Then, Won and Yannelis's (2006) assumption reduces to the following form: Let x = (x i ) i∈I ∈ A with I s (x) ̸ = ∅ and I ns (x) ̸ = ∅. Then, for each p ∈ R ℓ \ {0} that satisfies p · P j (x j ) > p · x j for all j ∈ I ns (x), we have p · s i ≥ p · ω i for all i ∈ I s (x). 14 Note that since s i is a unique element of S i if the set is nonempty, we have x i = s i for i ∈ I s (x).
We now provide the following example.
Example 3. Consider an exchange economy E with two commodities and three consumers. Let X i = R 2 + for all i ∈ I = {1, 2, 3}. Let ω 1 = ω 2 = (2, 2) and ω 3 = (4, 4). Consumers' utility functions are as follows. Note that s 1 = (8, 0) (̸ = ω 1 ) and s 2 = (0, 8) (̸ = ω 2 ) are the unique satiation points of consumers 1 and 2, while u 3 is never satiated on X 3 (see Figure 3 ). Note also that u i is continuous on X i for each i ∈ I. Consider an allocation x = (s 1 , s 2 , y 3 ) ∈ X, where y 3 = (0, 0) ∈ X 3 . It is clear that x is individually rational feasible. Note that I s (x) = {1, 2} and I ns = {3}.
Without loss of generality, we may assume that ν ′ > ν ′′ . Then, by (10), there exists (x j ) j̸ =i ∈ ∏ j̸ =i R j such that
Since s i ∈ A i = R i ∩ G i , there exists (y j ) j̸ =i ∈ ∏ j̸ =i R j such that
Then, (ν
2 )×(12) yields,
where
Therefore,
which contradicts (9).
Proof of Claim 3. Note first that since s 1 +ε ν 1 ∈ R 1 \A 1 and A 1 = R 1 ∩G 1 , we must have s 1 + ε ν 1 / ∈ G 1 . Suppose that the assertion of the claim is not true. Then, there exists (x j ) j̸ =1 ∈ ∏ j̸ =1 R j such that
Since s 1 ∈ R 1 ∩ (G 1 − {ε ν out }) (recall that ν ≥ ν ≥ ν in ), there exists (y j ) j̸ =1 ∈ ∏ j̸ =1 R j such that
Therefore, we have
